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ABSTRACT 
 
Freud (1895/1966; 1900/1953; 1915/1957) has proposed that primary 
process functioning is typical for acute psychosis. A non-verbal method, the 
„Geocat‟ (Brakel, Kleinsorge, Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2000), measures primary 
processes operationalised as attributional categorisation, which considers 
exemplars as similar if particular features match, even if these components are 
arranged in a quite different configuration. With the use of GeoCat we explored 
primary process mentation in 127 psychiatric patients. Results show that (1) there 
are substantially higher levels of attributional choices in our sample of psychiatric 
patients, independently of diagnosis, than in a non-patient population; (2) 
psychotic patients tend to have more attributional choices than non-psychotic 
patient; patients with acute psychotic symptoms show more attributional 
responses than patients without acute psychotic symptoms; (3) this increase of 
attributional choices with the psychotic condition is independent of self-rated 
anxiety or medication intake. We propose that, instead, this increase of 
attributional levels in the acutely psychotic patients reflects a predominance of 
primary processing which is specifically tied to the acutely psychotic condition, as 
proposed by Freud.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of what constitutes psychotic thinking has been a long-standing focus of 
interest in psychopathology. Building on previous work (Brakel, 2009; Brakel, 
Shevrin, & Villa, 2002; Brakel, 2004; Brakel & Shevrin, 2005; Vanheule, 
Roelstraete, Geerardyn, Murphy, Bazan, & Brakel, 2011), this empirical study 
proposes to test if there is predominance of primary process mentation in 
psychosis as was proposed by Freud by applying a new method that has shown 
promise in mapping primary and secondary processes, called the GeoCat, an 
abbreviation of “Geometric Categorisaton”  (Brakel, Kleinsorge, Snodgrass, & 
Shevrin, 2000; see further) in a population of psychiatric patients. 
 
Primary and secondary processes 
In Freud‟s concept of the mental apparatus (Freud, 1895/1966), the 
primary process is earlier both in ontogeny and phylogeny and reflects the 
primary function of the nervous system: the flight from incoming excitations by 
the shortest pathway possible by means of free flowing quantities which follow 
directly connected or contiguous neural pathways. At the mental level, the 
primary process denotes mechanisms of association that are characteristic of 
unconscious mental life, including “(…) faulty reasoning, absurdity, indirect 
representation, representation by the opposite” (Freud, 1905/1960, p. 88-89). 
Rapaport (1951, pp. 395-398) proposes that “pre-logical” states are dominated by 
the primary-process mechanisms of condensation, displacement, the toleration of 
contradictions, symbolisations, substitutions and “pars pro toto”. Holt (1967, p. 
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354) also speaks about an association on the basis of “non-essential” features. The 
overall outcome is a search for identity of perception (Freud, 1900/1953, p. 602), 
implying identity of visual but also phonological characteristics: “The ideas which 
transfer their intensities to each other stand in the loosest mutual relations. They 
are linked by associations of a kind that is scorned by our normal thinking and 
relegated to the use of jokes. In particular, we find associations based on 
homonyms and verbal similarities treated as equal in value to the rest.” (Freud 
1900/1953, p. 596).  The secondary process reflects a more developed functioning 
of the nervous system: the search for an adequate act as a response to the actual 
situation of need of the organism by means of a refrained flow of quantities under 
the inhibitory influence of the ego (Freud, 1895/1966). The secondary process 
functions to inhibit and control primary process tendencies that follow the 
pleasure principle: this process is “attuned to the efficient attainment of goals in 
reality with the delayed gratification of impulses that is necessary” (Holt, 2009, 
p.3). At the mental level, the secondary process refers to rational thinking and can 
be found in our waking and conscious thinking ruled by the reality principle 
(Freud, 1911/1958). It builds on the “thought identity” or the content of ideas 
(Freud, 1900/1953, p. 602), and functions to make logically plausible connections 
between ideas, while ignoring the intensity of the excitation related to to them.The 
distinction between these two principles of mental functioning has proven a useful 
tool for many authors after Freud (for a recent review of literature see Vanheule et 
al., 2010).  
 
Measuring primary and secondary process mentation 
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The first effort to find non-clinical confirmation of Freud‟s primary 
process theory of dream formation was undertaken by Schrötter (1911/1951) who 
used hypnosis to track symbolic transformations in dreams of prior hypnotic 
suggestions (see also Roffenstein, 1924/1951; Nachmansohn, 1925/1951). Using 
brief exposures of pictures, Pötzl (1917) found that parts of a stimulus presented 
below the perception threshold appeared in the manifest content of the subsequent 
dreams but that these fragments had undergone significant distortions closely 
resembling the mechanisms of the primary process (see also Fisher, 1954, 
1957).For the assessment of the primary process, Shevrin and Luborsky (1961) 
introduced the rebus method – e.g. a rebus composed of e.g. the pictures of a pen 
and a knee - directly inspired from Freud‟s Interpretation of dreams. Primary 
process reading of this subliminally presented picture-puzzle leads to the 
phonemic condensation of the sounds and therefore to the new word penny or its 
related associations, appearing in dreams following the subliminal presentation. 
Moreover, for the first time, brain markers for secondary and primary process 
effects were demonstrated linking the study of primary process to neuroscience 
(see Shevrin, 1973 for a review of these studies). A recent study by Villa, Shevrin, 
Snodgrass, Bazan and Brakel (2006), based on the same theoretical principles, has 
brought further evidence that unconsciously words are treated as sensorimotor 
objects while consciously the same words are treated as counters in meaning.  
However, not all studies dealing with primary process thinking used the 
method of subliminal stimulation. Rapaport, Gill and Schafer (1945-46) and Holt 
(Holt, 1956, 1977, 2002; Holt & Havel, 1960) independently developed methods 
to identify primary process in Rorschach responses . Recently, Holt has published 
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an extensive manual for his “Primary Process System” (PRIPRO-system; Holt, 
2007, 2009) which assesses both content and formal characteristics of primary 
process but also examines whether manifestations of condensation, displacement, 
symbolization, contradiction and distortion can be discerned in people‟s 
thinking.Auld, Goldenberg and Weiss (1968) constructed a rating scale fort the 
scoring of primary process thinking in dreams. Finally, Martindale and Dailey 
(1996) developed a computerized scoring system (the Regressive Imagery 
Dictionary) that can be applied in computerized lexical analyses of a variety of 
text materials. It focuses primarily on content characteristics of primary process   
However, these different methods are often complex and lengthy and they 
are at least partially based on content analysis, implying an interpretation of the 
materials produced by the subject, which often requires clinical skills and 
(extensive) training. Finally, these different methods are based on linguistic 
materials, limiting their use in children or for cross-cultural comparisons. The 
present study uses a geometric categorization task, called GeoCat (Brakel et al., 
2000), which is an example of a formal, non-verbal index of primary and 
secondary process mentation which can be administered independently of the 
psychoanalytic clinical interpretation or training as well as independently of 
language. Previous studies have confirmed the validity of the GeoCat for the 
measurement of primary and secondary process mentation (Brakel et al., 2000; 
Brakel et al., 2002; Brakel & Shevrin, 2005; Vanheule et al., 2011). 
 
The Present Study 
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We wished to determine if using GeoCat method we would find a 
predominance of primary process mentation in psychosis as was proposed by 
Freud. Indeed, in the Freudian model of psychosis, psychodynamic processes 
typical for the unconscious are present in conscious mental life: “As regards the 
relation of the two psychical systems [the conscious and the unconscious], all 
observers have been struck by the fact that in schizophrenia a great deal is 
expressed as being conscious which in the transference neuroses can only be 
shown to be present in the Ucs. by psycho-analysis.” (Freud, 1915/1957, p .197). 
Fenichel (1945) agrees: « In non-psychotic persons, this mode of thinking is still 
effective in the unconscious. Therefore the impression arises that in schizophrenia 
“the unconscious has become conscious”.» and he adds: « Because the „primary 
process
i‟ and the archaic ways of thinking have come to the fore again, 
schizophrenics are not estranged by these mechanisms any more. ». Freud 
(1900/1953, p. 568) underscores that psychosis, in this respect, is similar to the 
dream: the same regression, which in the dream leads to predominance of the 
primary process, is also seen in psychosis where it can lead to hallucinatory 
regression. In particular positive psychotic symptoms, such as hallucinations, 
perceptual distortions and delusions, function along primary process principles 
(Freud, 1895/1966, pp. 326-327; 1900/1953, p. 605). Finally, Freud indicates that 
the verbal transformations, typical for the language of schizophrenics (see e.g., 
Robbins, 2002), also reflect primary process functioning: « In schizophrenia, 
words are subject to the same process as that which makes dream images out of 
dream thoughts, the one we have called the primary process They undergo 
condensation, and by means of displacement transfer their cathexes to one another 
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in their entirety. The process may go so far that a single word, if it is especially 
suitable on account of its numerous connections, takes over the representation of a 
whole train of thought. » (Freud, 1915/1957, p. 186; see also, Bazan, 2006). 
Previously and more recently, several authors have argued along the same lines 
that language use in schizophrenics typically reflects a lesser functioning of the 
secondary processes (e.g. Bazan, 2007b; Bazan & Van de Vijver, 2009a, b; 
Bonnard, 1969; Roulot, 2004). 
On the basis of Freud‟s propositions according to which psychotic 
thinking can be understood as a form of primary process mentation, we collected 
GeoCat responses in a residential psychotic population and sought to explore 
three questions: 1) will hospitalized (residential) psychiatric patients show 
significantly more attributional responses compared to the healthy adults of a 
previous study with the GeoCat; 2) will hospitalized psychotic patients show 
more attributional responses than non-psychotic psychiatric patients and 3) will 
psychotic patients in an acute hallucinatory or delusional state show more 
attributional choices than patients without acute psychotic symptoms.  
 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
The research included 127 psychiatric patients, either psychotic (n=72) or 
not psychotic (n=55). The participants were recruited from three different 
institutions:  Clinique de la Borde in Cour-Cheverny (n=25) in France, Psychiatric 
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Centers Dr. Guislain in Ghent (n=59) and St.-Amandus in Beernem (n= 43) in 
Belgium. Research language was either French (Clinique de la Borde) or Dutch 
(Psychiatric Centers Dr. Guislain and St.-Amandus). The ethics oversight 
committees of the respective institutions approved the research; individual 
participants gave informed consent for the research as well as for access to their 
medical files. All data obtained were registered and stored anonymously.  
There are no significant demographic differences between the two 
populations. The mean age of the psychotic versus non-psychotic patients is 40.3 
(± 1.41) versus 42.0 (± 1.77) years ( standard error of the mean, SEM). The 
gender proportion is 81/19 versus 73/27 in the psychotic respectively the non-
psychotic population. Both the psychotic and the non-psychotic group include 
substantially more men than women; this is due to the fact that the Psychiatric 
Center Sint-Amandus is (historically) a psychiatric center for male patients only. 
The mean number years of education is 11.8 ( .24) and 12.4 (  .29) years and 
the mean length of hospitalisation is 15.3 ( 1.21) and 11.8 ( 1.75) years for the 
psychotic respectively the non-psychotic patients  (±SEM). 
Though psychotic patients take more neuroleptics than non-psychotic 
patients (97.2 versus 73.1%; ²(2)=17.011, p<.001), remarkably, a very 
substantial portion of the non-psychotic patients also receive neuroleptic 
medication in their use as so called “behaviour stabilisators”. Psychotic patients 
also have more anxiolytics (53.5 vesus 32.7%; ²(2)=6.926, p=.031, two-tailed 
test); intake of other medication was comparable in both patient groups. 
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Diagnoses 
Information concerning the differential diagnosis was obtained from the 
treating psychiatrist and psychologist, who both knew the patient for at least 6 
months. The first author was the treating psychologist at the psychiatric centre 
Sint-Amandus in Beernem (n=47); K.V.D. and L.D.C. were psychology interns in 
the psychiatric Center Dr. Guislain in Ghent (n= 43) and in Clinique de la Borde 
in Cour-Cheverny in France (n=25) respectively, at the time of the study
ii
. 
Patients diagnosed as “psychotic” had one the following DSM-IV-R-diagnoses: 
schizophrenia [disorganized type, 295.10 (n=8); catatonic type, 295.20 (n=3), 
paranoid type, 295.30 (n=43); residual type, 295.60 (n=2); schizoaffective 
disorder, 295.70 (n=3) and undifferentiated type, 295.90 (n=5)] and psychotic 
disorders [bipolar I disorder, 296.54 (n=2); delusional disorder, 297.1 (n=4) and 
psychotic disorder NOS, 298.9 (n=2)]. Patients diagnosed as “non-psychotic” had 
one the following DSM-diagnoses: personality disorders [301 (n=17)], mood 
disorders [296 (n=13)], alcohol intoxication [303.90 (n=13)], adjustment disorders 
[309 (n=4)], autistic disorder [299.00 (n=2)], dysthymic disorder [300.4 (n=2)], 
cannabis intoxication [292.89 (n=1)], amnestic disorder [294.0 (n=1)], obsessive 
compulsive disorder [300.3 (n=1)] and pathological gambling [312.31 (n=1)]. 
 
Procedure and Stimuli 
All participants were personally asked for their voluntary participation and 
briefly informed about what the research program included. They were not 
promised any kind of compensation, financial or other and were told that they 
could withdraw at any time. After giving consent, the participant was invited into 
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a quiet room and shown a GeoCat form. This form consists of six squares 
presenting in the bottom both attributional and relational variants of a top 
“master” figure (Brakel et al. 2002, p. 486)iii.  
The theoretical basis of the GeoCat is that primary and secondary 
processes are reflected in two distinct modes of mental organization which are 
called “attributional” and “relational” cognition in cognitive psychology (see 
Brakel et al., 2000). Briefly, in attributional thinking exemplars are regarded as 
similar if particular features or attributes match, even if the configurational 
disposition of these features are quite different. As attributional similarity thus 
associates objects on the basis of common but inessential features, it is proposed 
to reflect primary process mentation. Attributional thinking is contrasted with 
“relational” thinking which is a mode of cognitive categorization that builds on 
logical relationships between even very different features and takes the total 
configuration of these components into account. From a Freudian point of view, 
this type of cognitive process is based on the thought identity of given cues and 
reflects secondary process mentation.  
The written instruction was read by the researcher: “On this form there are 
six squares. Each square contains one item at the top and two below. Look at the 
top central figure; decide which of the two choices below is more similar to the 
top central one. Circle your answer to each.”. To this the researcher added that no 
item was either correct or incorrect, and that we were simply interested in the 
participant‟s own choice. The dependent variable was the number of 
attributional choices (ATTs) on the GeoCat: it varies between 0 and 6 (the 
number of relational choices  or RELs then is the mirror reverse and varies 
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between 6 and 0). Two ways of calculating were used: (1) the mean (and median) 
number of ATTs and (2) the % of participants favouring ATTs.  
After the GeoCat, the participants completed the State-version of the 
Spielberg‟s State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger, Gorsuch & 
Lushene, 1970; Spielberger, 1979). In Belgium the Dutch translation (Van Der 
Ploeg, Defares and Spielberger, 1980) and in France the French translation 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg and Jacobs, 1993) were used.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Attributional Responses in Psychiatric versus Non-psychiatric Adult 
Population 
A Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) goodness of fit test revealed that the 
distribution of ATTs is non-normal in our sample of psychiatric patients 
(KSZ=2.496; p<.001). Inspection of the histogram shows that the distribution of 
ATTs in the psychiatric population conforms to a J-curve rather than to a normal 
distribution (Figure 1, left graph). The Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks (WSR) test 
(WSRZ=-3.043, p=.002), and Sign (S) test (SZ=-2.626, p=.009) show that ATTs 
predominate over RELs to a significant degree. The psychiatric patients are 
compared with a normal non-psychiatric population of a previous study called 
LifeCat in which the GeoCat was administered in exactly the same manner 
(Brakel et al., 2002), In this study, the distribution was already also non-normal 
but conformed to an inverse J-curve (KSZ=4.634; p<.001; see Figure 1, right 
Met opmaak: Engels
(Groot-Brittannië)
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graph). The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs test (Z=6.70, p<.001) and Sign test (Z=7.45, 
p<.001) in the non-psychiatric participant group of comparable age had shown 
that RELs were selected significantly more often than ATTs. 
 
= = = = =  insert Figure 1 about here = = = = = 
 
The mean number of ATTs in the present study (called “AcuteCat”, 
psychiatric patients; 3.66±0.21) is more than double the mean in the LifeCat study 
(non-patient participants; 1.76±0.14) (p<.001, one-tailed; Mann-Whitney U or 
MWU=9389.0; Wilcoxon W or W=41774.0; Z=-6,941). The differences between 
the two samples are even more clear-cut for the medians
iv
 (4 and 0) and the modes 
(6 and 0) in the psychiatric, respectively the non-psychiatric samples. These 
results are summarised in Table 1. 
 
= = = = =  insert Table 1 about here = = = = = 
 
There is a highly significant shift in number of ATTs in the psychiatric 
population when compared to a non-psychiatric population of comparable age; 
psychiatric patients show a complete inversion of their response pattern, with 60% 
of the psychiatric patients, selecting a majority of ATTs while in the LifeCat 
sample, 24% selected a majority of ATTs. This difference is highly significant 
(p<0.001; ²=50.870; see Figure 1). The skewness of the number of ATTs in the 
AcuteCat sample is -.448, indicating a long left tail, while the skewness in the 
LifeCat sample is +.955, indicating a long right tail.  
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The level of self-rated anxiety in this psychiatric population, as measured 
by the STAI, is high: the mean self-rated anxiety is 45.01.2. Though we have no 
anxiety measures for the LifeCat study, the STAI-values of the present study are 
substantially and significantly higher than normal values, as given by the Dutch 
(36.4; p<.001) or French (35.73; p<.001) norms for populations of comparable 
age. The level of anxiety did not correlate with the number of ATTs in the total 
psychiatric population (Spearman ρ=.009; p=.923). 
 
 
Attributional Responses in Psychotic versus Non-Psychotic Patients 
The distribution of ATTs is non-normal in both the sample of psychotic 
and of the non-psychotic patients (KSZ=2.060 and 1.561; p<.001 and =.015 
respectively). The distribution of ATTs in the psychotic population conforms to a 
J-curve, while the distribution in the non-psychotic sample conforms to a U-curve 
(Figure 2, left and right graphs respectively). In the psychotic sample, ATTs 
predominate over RELs to a significant degree  (WSRZ=-3.363, p=.001 and SZ= -
2.889, p=.004), while in the non-psychotic sample there is no significant 
predominance of ATTs over RELs or vice versa (WSRZ=-.800, p=.424 and SZ=-
.549, p=.583).  
 
= = = = =  insert Figure 2 about here = = = = = 
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The mean number of ATTs in the psychotic patients (3.97±.27) is higher 
than in the non-psychotic patients (3.25±.34) but the difference is only marginally 
significant (p=.06, one-tailed; MWU=1671.5; W=3211.5; Z=-1.555). Both 
samples have different medians (5 and 4 in the psychotic and the non-psychotic 
patients respectively). These results are summarised in Table 2.  
 
= = = = =  insert Table 2 about here = = = = = 
 
The difference between the proportion of psychotic versus non-psychotic 
patients showing predominantly respectively ATTs (65.3% and 52.7% 
respectively) or RELs (30.6% versus 43.6%), though in the expected direction, is 
only marginally significant (p=.065, one-tailed; ²=2.291; see Table 2). The 
skewness of the number of ATTs in the psychotic sample is -.690, indicating a 
long left tail, while the skewness in the non-psychotic sample is -.160, indicating 
a more or less symmetrical distribution (see Figure 2).  
The levels of self-rated anxiety does not differ between psychotic and non-
psychotic patients (44.71.5 and 45.5±2.0 respectively) nor does it correlate with 
the number of ATTs in any of the two populations (Spearman ρ=.041 and .001; 
p=.742 and .994 for psychotics and non-psychotics respectively). 
 
Attributional Responses in Patients with and without Acute Psychotic 
Symptoms. 
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In a second step, we verify if we obtain more clear-cut differences if we 
compare patients with acute psychotic symptoms (part of the psychotic patients) 
and patients without acute psychotic symptoms (the rest of the psychotic and all 
non-psychotic patients). Patients are judged to have acute psychotic symptoms if 
at least one of the following positive symptoms was reported: hallucinations, 
perceptual distortions, voices, intrusive experiences or delusions, at the moment 
of or on the day preceding the experiment. Inpatients considered without acute 
psychotic symptoms were those who registered no symptoms for at least a week 
before and at least a weak after the experiment. Monitoring of positive symptoms 
in the patients is continuous as patients are taken care of day and night by 
competent nursing professionals (well staffed with approximately one nurse for 
four patients); this staff meets five times a day, including three times a day with 
the treating psychologist and once a week with the psychiatrist. The psychologist 
has his or her consulting room in the residential department and/or is among the 
patients when not consulting. By doing so the psychotic patient group sorted into 
in two even groups: psychotic patients with acute psychotic symptoms (n=36) and 
psychotic patients without acute psychotic symptoms (n=36)
v
.  
The distribution of ATTs is non-normal in both the patients with and 
without acute psychotic symptoms (KSZ=1.872 and 1.855; p=.002 and .002 
respectively). The distribution of ATTs in the patients with acute psychotic 
symptoms conforms to a J-curve, while the distribution in patients without acute 
psychotic symptoms conforms to a U-curve (Figure 3, left and right graphs 
respectively). In the sample with acute psychotic symptoms, ATTs predominate 
over RELs to a significant degree (WSRZ=-3.275, p=.001 and SZ=-2.572, 
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p=.010), while in sample without acute psychotic symptoms while in the non-
psychotic sample there is no significant predominance of ATTs over RELs 
(WSRZ=-1.522, p=.128 and SZ=-1.386, p=.166). 
The mean number of ATTs in the patients with acute psychotic symptoms 
(4.31±.37) is significantly higher than in the patients without acute psychotic 
symptoms (3.41±.26) (p=.019, one-tailed; MWU=1262.0; W=5448.0; Z=-2.083). 
Both samples have different medians (5 and 4 in the patients with, respectively 
without, acute psychotic symptoms). These results are summarised in Table 3.  
 
= = = = =  insert Table 3 about here = = = = = 
 
The proportions of patients with versus without acute psychotic symptoms 
showing predominantly ATTs is 69.4% and 56.1% respectively. The difference is 
more marked for the proportions of patients with versus without acute psychotic 
symptoms showing predominantly RELs (25.0% versus 40.7%). These 
differences are marginally significant (p=.056, one-tailed; ²=2.533; see Table 3). 
The skewness of the number of ATTs in the sample with acute psychotic 
symptoms is -.906, indicating a long left tail, while the skewness in the sample 
without acute psychotic symptoms is -.294, indicating a more symmetrical 
distribution (see Figure 3).  
 
 
= = = = =  insert Figure 3 about here = = = = = 
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The levels of self-rated anxiety, though lower in the group with acute 
psychotic symptoms, did not differ significantly from the level in the group 
without acute psychotic symptoms (42.42.3 and 46.0±1.5 respectively; t=-1.337; 
p=.184). This level of anxiety did not correlate with the number of ATTs 
(Spearman ρ=.032 and .017; p=.858 and .879  for patients with and without acute 
psychotic symptoms respectively).  
It thus seems that the psychotic patients without acute psychotic symptoms 
behave as non-psychotic patients when it comes to their choices on the GeoCat 
test. Indeed, the mean number of ATTs in these two groups (non-symptomatic 
psychotics, n=36 and non-psychotics, n=55) did not differ (3.64±.39 and 3.25±.34 
respectively) (p=.29, one-tailed; MWU=925.0; W=2465.0; Z=-.542).  
 
The Influence of Medication on Attributional Choices. 
As indicated, psychotic patients take significantly more neuroleptics and 
anxiolytics than non-psychotic patients. When comparing patients with and 
without acute psychotic symptoms, we found that, similarly, the patient group 
with acute psychotic symptoms takes more neuroleptics (97.2 versus 82.8%; 
²(2)=4.707, p=.030) and more anxiolytics (58.3 versus 39.1%; ²(2)=3.818, 
p=.051) than the patient group without these acute symptoms (two-tailed tests). 
However, the number of ATTs in the whole patient group did not correlate with 
medication intake, neither for the neuroleptics nor for the anxiolytics (Spearman 
ρ=-.104 and -.132; p=.250 and .146 respectively). Therefore, we have no 
indications that the differences in medication between the groups could explain 
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the differences in ATTs. Note that there is also no correlation between the levels 
of self-rated anxiety and the intake of anxiolytics or neuroleptics (r=.053 and -
.019; p=.567 and .838 respectively).  
The potential interaction effect of the neuroleptics intake with the patient 
group could not be verified, as there were only two psychotic patients, 
respectively one patient with acute psychotic symptoms, not taking neuroleptics. 
However, there were no differences between the two patient groups in 
correlations between ATTs and neuroleptics intake (ρ=-.178; p=.138 versus ρ=-
.150; p=.281 in the psychotic versus in the non-psychotic patients and ρ=-.150; 
p=.383 versus ρ=-.140; p=.195 in patients with and without acute psychotic 
symptoms).We verified the potential interaction effects of the anxiolytics with the 
patient group on the number of ATTs with a nonparametric method, the adjusted 
rank transform test (Leys & Schumann, 2010). However, no interaction effect was 
found, neither for the comparison between psychotic and non-psychotic patients 
(Factorial Anova on the adjusted ranks, F=.260; p=.611), nor for the comparison 
of the patients with and without acute psychotic symptoms (F=2.231; p=.138). 
When subtracting possible interaction effects of the anxiolytics intake, the main 
effect of the patient group on ATTs remained non-significant in the case of the 
comparison between psychotics and non-psychotics (F=2.032; p=.157) and 
significant in the case of the comparison between patients with and without acute 
psychotic symptoms (F=5.438; p=.021) (two-tailed tests).  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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Three questions were investigated with the GeoCat method in which the number 
of ATTs are proposed to probe for primary process mentation: 1) will psychiatric 
patients show significantly more ATTs compared to non-patients; 2) will 
psychotic patients show more ATTs than non-psychotic psychiatric patients and 
3) will psychotic patients in an acute hallucinatory or delusional state show more 
ATTs than patients without acute psychotic symptoms.  
First, in the present study it is found that, regardless of the psychotic 
condition, the mean number of ATTs in the psychiatric patients is more than 
double the mean in a non-patient adult population, (“LifeCat”) with about 60% 
versus about 30% of ATTs respectively. Accordingly, it is proposed that 
mentation is much more dominated by primary processes in residential psychiatric 
subjects. This is not surprising as it may be assumed that general levels of anxiety 
are substantially higher in this population, which correlates well with the self-
rated anxiety measure showing significantly above normal levels of anxiety in the 
psychiatric population. Using the same GeoCat instrument, we have shown before 
that anxiety correlates highly with primary process mentation (Brakel & Shevrin, 
2005). In this respect it is important to note that in the present study the anxiety 
measure did not correlate with the number of ATTs, However, it must be noted 
that the levels are generally very high in this psychiatric population so that a 
ceiling effect probably masks the sort of correlation previously found. Another 
factor may be important for the attributional shift in the psychiatric population, 
namely the infantilising effect expected from living in a residential setting. This 
regressive influence is also thought to lead to more primary process mentation. 
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Therefore, we believe that the substantial shift to more ATTs correlates with a 
genuine higher level of primary process mentation in a population of residential 
psychiatric patients. 
When comparing the results on the GeoCat, we found that psychotic patients had 
a higher mean number of ATTs than non-psychotic patients, but the result is only 
marginally significant. When we compare the patients with acute psychotic 
symptoms with patients without acute psychotic symptoms , we do find a 
significant increase. Therefore, we think that the increase of ATTs in the group of 
psychotic patients is real but not large enough to become significant in the present 
sample, and that it is carried by the subgroup of psychotic patients with acute 
psychotic symptoms. Comparison of the distribution graphs in the different 
populations indicates that the sensitive part related to the acutely psychotic 
condition is the relative absence of subjects who give an “all relational” response 
pattern, with zero attributional choices. This fits well with the proposition that 
“relational” choices are based on secondary processes, and with stabilised 
psychotic patients being indistinguishable from non-psychotic psychiatric patients 
in that respect. In other words, it is psychotic decompensation which is 
specifically related to a a relative absence of secondary processes and to primary 
process predominance, producing both positive psychotic symptoms and 
preferential attributional categorisation.  
Finally, the influence of medication should be considered since there is 
more neuroleptics and anxiolytics intake in the psychotic patients. The intake of 
these medications does not correlate with the number of ATTs. This is not 
surprising, since there was also no influence of the medication on the level of self-
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rated anxiety. For comparison, we report two previous studies on neuroleptics, 
where the effects of the typical antipsychotic phenothiazines on primary process 
thinking were measured on schizophrenic patients. Research data were obtained 
from pre- and postdrug Rorschach protocols, which were scored using Holt's 
(1959) method for measuring primary process. In one study, as patients improved, 
so did the control of primary process mentation (Saretsky, 1966); in the other 
(Ebert, Ewing, Rogers, & Reynolds, 1977), there were progressive decreases on 
formal primary process scores. In these studies, however, the within-subjects 
design measured changes in each subject‟s primary process-parameters before and 
after drug treatment, while in the present research, between-subjects measures are 
employed which are not sensitive to the ameliorative effects of medications on 
individual participants.  
There are some limitations to this study, which are tied to the diagnostic 
procedures. Differential diagnosis between psychotic and non-psychotic patients 
is based upon the psychiatric diagnosis made by the treating psychiatrist on the 
basis of the DSM-IV in accord with the treating (psychodynamically trained) 
psychologist. Distinction between patients with and without acute psychotic 
symptoms is based upon reports by the caregivers as described above. 
Standardized questionnaires or checklist procedures were not used. Though this is 
a limitation, we want to underscore that all the patients of this study were 
residential patients for many years in the institution with well documented 
medical files and that different authors of the study (A.B., K.V.D., L.D) were 
practicing clinicians in the institutions at the time of the research. 
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In conclusion, our results show that there is an increased level of 
attributional choices in psychotic patients when they are in an acute state of their 
condition, and that that level is significantly higher than the already increased 
levels in the other psychiatric patients without acute psychotic symptoms. As self-
rated anxiety levels are identical in the psychotic and non-psychotic population, 
anxiety can not be related to this further increase. Instead, as suggested above, we 
propose that this further increase of attributional levels in the acutely psychotic 
patients reflects an emergence of primary process thinking, and a lesser 
proportion of secondary processing, reflective of the acutely psychotic condition 
as described long ago by Freud (1895; 1900; 1915) and others (Bleuler, 1911). 
This also coheres with Holt (2002)‟s general conclusion, resulting from a review 
of fourteen empirical studies based on Holt‟s PRIPRO-system in Rorschach 
protocols in schizophrenia. Although the results are somewhat scattered, Holt 
(2002: 474) concludes that, on the whole, they support the psychoanalytic 
expectation that schizophrenia is “accompanied by the disruptive emergence of 
primary process thinking into conscious thought”. These results are also in line 
with the concept of “thought disorder” (e.g. Kasanin, 1944; Andreasen, 2008) in 
schizophrenia, i.e. thinking which contains “incoherence, tangentiality, or 
derailment (loose associations)” (Andreasen, 2008, p. 436). Remarkably Von 
Domarus (1944) calls it “paralogical thinking”, namely thinking for which 
identity is based on partial identification rather than on total identity. 
The fact that we were able to show more attributional mentation in acute 
psychosis confers supplementary convergent validation for GeoCat as a test of 
primary process mentation. Obviously, this supports the test as a useful diagnostic 
 24 
tool which may contribute valuable clinical information, indicating if a patient is 
in a predominantly primary process mode at the moment of the testing. However, 
some caution is advised since this new instrument is still in development. 
Moreover, the predominance of primary processes is not indicative of psychosis 
per se, as a diverse number of pathological conditions (such as trauma, anxiety) 
and non-pathological states (such as regression, creativity, hypnosis) are also 
characterised by primary process predominance. However, provided this caution, 
the tool promises to be clinically most useful as it is rapid, non-linguistic, easy to 
use and independent of clinical interpretation. 
Finally, the present results also fit well with a number of recent 
neuroscientific accounts for the Freudian primary and secondary processes, which 
all associate the psychotic condition with a lesser control of secondary over 
primary processes. Recently, indeed, the neuroscientists Carhart-Harris and 
Friston (2010) have proposed that Freud‟s descriptions of primary and secondary 
processes are consistent with self-organized activity in hierarchical cortical 
systems where the secondary process provides top-down predictions to reduce 
free-energy associated with the primary process. The authors propose that the 
high-levels of this inferential hierarchy form a cortical network of regions which 
they call the “default-mode network” (DMN). The DMN is a cortical network of 
strongly interconnected nodes (including the medial prefrontal cortex, the 
posterior cingulate cortex, the inferior parietal lobule, the lateral and inferior 
temporal cortex and the medial temporal lobes) which show high metabolic 
activity and blood flow at rest but which deactivate during goal-directed cognition 
(Raichle, MacLeod, Snyder, Gusnard, & Shulman, 2001). Recent work has shown 
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reduced task-evoked suppressions of DMN activity in schizophrenia (Pomarol-
Clotet, Salvador, Sarró, Gomar, Vila, Martínez, et al., 2008; Whitfield-Gabrieli, 
Thermenos, Milanovic, Tsuang, Faraone, McCarley, et al., 2009) the severity of 
which correlated positively with connectivity in the DMN (Whitfield-Gabrieli et 
al., 2009). Therefore, Carhart-Harris and Friston (2010) propose that 
schizophrenia is associated with a loss of top-down control of the DMN over 
limbic activity in hierarchically lower systems and that this is equivalent to a loss 
of control from the ego and the associated secondary process over the primary 
process (p. 3). This, of course, would fit well with the results of the present study.  
We have proposed a parallel account for the Freudian primary and 
secondary processes before (Bazan, 2007a, 2007b), which could also fit in 
Carhart-Harris and Friston‟s view. Freud (1895, p. 326-327) had said: “[Wishful 
discharges] to the point of hallucination and complete generation of unpleasure 
which involves a complete expenditure of defence are described by us as 
psychical primary processes; by contrast, those processes which are only made 
possible by a good engagement of the ego, and which represent a moderation in 
the foregoing, and are described as psychical secondary processes. It will be seen 
that the necessary preconditions of the latter is a correct employment of the 
indications of reality, which is only possible when there is inhibition by the ego.”. 
The differentiating criterion between primary and secondary process in a Freudian 
account, then, are the so-called “indications of reality”. Based on historical, 
anatomical, functional and semantic arguments, a parallel between these 
“indications of reality”, which Freud derived from a Helmholtzian model of 
perception, and the recent “efference copy models”, which is also rooted in the 
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model developed by von Helmholtz, was proposed (Bazan, 2007a, 2007b). 
Starting from this parallel, it was further proposed that the dorsal pathway 
(involving dorsal and prefrontal cortices), which makes use of these efference 
copies for the organisation of contextualised action, might be considered as a 
neurophysiological correlate for the secondary process. This dorsal pathway 
hierarchically controls selection of activations in the ventral pathway (Friedman-
Hill, Robertson, Desimone & Ungerleider, 2003; Hamker, 2003; Rousselet, 
Thorpe & Fabre-Thorpe, 2004), which for this (and other) reason(s) might be 
considered as a neurophysiological correlate for the primary process (Bazan, 
2007a, 2007b). Indeed, selective impairment of the dorsal “where” route (but not 
of the ventral “what” pathway) has been associated with the psychotic condition 
(Daniel, Mores, Carite, Boyer, & Denis, 2006). Therefore, this dorsal/ventral 
neurophysiological account also fits well with the diminished secondary processes 
and increased primary processes in the acute stage of psychosis observed in our 
data.  
The results of this research then contribute to support three important 
propositions: Freud‟s proposition that psychosis is characterised by a 
predominance of primary process mentation, the usefulness of the Geocat as a 
measure of primary process mentation, and the possibility of empirically testing 
psychoanalytic hypotheses with methods independent of the psychoanalytic 
clinic.  
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Figure 1: Distributions of attributional responses in the psychiatric population of 
the present study (left) and in a healthy (non-psychiatric) population of 
comparable age (LifeCat study, Brakel et al., 2002; right). 
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Figure 2: Distributions of the attributional responses in the psychotic patients 
(left) and in the non-psychotic psychiatric patients (right).  
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Figure 3: Distributions of the attributional responses in the patients with (left) and 
without (right) acute psychotic symptoms. 
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Table 1: Mean (± SEM), median and mode number of attributional 
responses (out of maximum 6) and percentage of participants favouring 
attributional (ATT) above relational (REL) choices in a psychiatric population 
(AcuteCat, present study) versus in a non-psychiatric population of comparable 
age (LifeCat, Brakel et al., 2002); mean anxiety score (± SEM) on the Spielberger 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). 
 
 
Study  population (age) n mean median mode % ATT > REL   STAI 
AcuteCat   total (18-68) 127 3.66 ± 0.21* 4 6 59.8*  45.0 ± 1.2** 
LifeCat   adults (19-69) 254 1.76 ± 0.14 0 0 24.0 / 
 
* p < 0.001 as compared to non-psychiatric participants of comparable age; one-
tailed 
** p<.001 as compared to the Dutch (36.4) or French (35.73) norms for a 
population of comparable age 
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Table 2: Mean (± SEM), median and mode number of attributional responses (out 
of maximum 6) and percentage of participants favouring attributional (ATT) 
above relational (REL) choices in psychotic patients versus non-psychotic 
patients; mean anxiety score (± SEM) on the STAI. 
 
 
Patient population n mean median mode % ATT > REL   STAI 
Psychotic 72 3.97±.27* 5 6 65.3 44.7 ± 1.5 
Non-Psychotic 55 3.25±.34 4 6 52.8 45.4 ± 2.0 
 
* p =.060 as compared to non-psychotic patients; one-tailed 
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Table 3: Mean (± SEM), median and mode number of attributional responses (out 
of maximum 6) and percentage of participants favouring attributional (ATT) 
above relational (REL) choices in patients with and without acute psychotic 
symptoms (); mean anxiety score (± SEM) on the STAI.  
 
 
Patient population n mean median mode % ATT > REL   STAI 
with  acute 
psychotic  
36 4.31±.37* 6 6 65.3 42.4 ± 2.3 
without 91 3.41±.26 4 6 52.8 46.0 ± 1.5 
 
* p <.05 as compared to patients without acute psychotic symptoms; one-tailed 
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i
 Italics added 
ii
 The GeoCat forms were administered with the help of the “naïve” researchers 
Stijn Van Eeckhoven and Bram Herrebout, who were blind to the hypotheses and 
to the test rationale. 
iii
 For use of the GeoCat, please contact Pr. Brakel (brakel@umich.edu). 
iv
 Medians are a useful measure especially for skewed distributions. 
v
 This leads to uneven groups for comparison, with n = 36 for the patients with 
acute psychotic symptoms and n = 91 (36 psychotic patients + 55 non-psychotic 
patients) for the patients without acute psychotic symptoms. However, as we are 
using non-parametric statistics, which do not require the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance, this is not a problem. 
